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THE EVOLVING CONCEPT OF




PERATIONAL risk (OpR) is one of the main risks that finan-
cial institutions face and has been given significant attention in
recent years. Traditionally, management of OpR was viewed as a
function of a specific section of a financial institution, namely, the back
office. The ill functioning of back offices did contribute to some of the
largest OpR failures.I Nevertheless, OpR is a managerial issue which re-
quires institution-wide attention.
The importance of OpR is made apparent from its increasing recogni-
tion by regulators. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel
Committee) proposed new guidelines for capital adequacy purposes in
1999, and risk assessment of OpR is an important component of their new
capital adequacy regime. 2 Financial institutions are also dedicating more
financial resources and risk management tools to address OpR. 3
The difficulty in managing OpR is compounded by the fact that its
main cause is human error.4 While eradicating human error is nearly im-
possible, controlling it often requires greater resources. Further, OpR
does not enjoy the benefit of market discipline that other risks may have
and there exist a variety of definitions reflecting individual financial insti-
*Mamiko Yokoi-Arai, BA, MA, PhD (London), Lecturer in International Finance
Law at Queen Mary, University of London. Her primary research is on legal is-
sues of financial crisis. She has published a number of articles, written a book on
the financial crisis in east Asia, and edited a book on international financial crises
in the 1990s. She has worked at the Bank of Japan in relation to international
policy issues and has had a wide range of consulting experience dealing with inter-
national financial law reform and developmental issues.
1. For example, the failure of Barings and the closure of the U.S. operations of
Daiwa Bank are some of the prominent incidents.
2. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, THE NEW CAPITAL ACCORD: AN
EXPLANATORY NOTE (2001).
3. This includes "increased budgets for operational risk measurement, monitoring
and control, as well as in the assignment of responsibility for measuring and moni-
toring operational risk to new or existing risk management units." BASEL COMMIT-
TEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT 5 (1998).
4. Operational risk is defined as losses deriving from inadequate system, controls or
human errors, of which all have an element of the incapacity of humans.
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tutions' approaches to OpR management. 5
Until recently, the absence of sufficient attention to OpR could be ex-
plained partly as a result of the difficulties in its identification, and partly
because the benefit of a better managed OpR profile was not apparent to
financial institutions. Ideally, managing OpR encompasses the efforts of
the entire financial institution to maintain a capital charge against the
OpR.6 Having "better OpR" management was not regarded as a value
that shareholders would embrace or investors would consider in their in-
vestment decisions. Financial institutions preferred to maintain OpR as
minimally as permissible. There was a race to the bottom of OpR until
discussions on revising the Capital Accord of the Basel Committee
started in 1999. Other factors that have worked towards increased atten-
tion to OpR include: greater use of insurance towards OpR; greater out-
sourcing of services; higher capital adequacy and regulatory requirements
for OpR; and stricter requirements by providers of payment, clearing and
settlement services. 7
The significance of OpR is only beginning to be understood. The cur-
rent level of research on the subject is minimal,8 and one pundit has de-
scribed academic research as "impractical." 9 The Basel Committee's
work has already resulted in a surge in OpR research and discussion, and
it is likely to result in greater emphasis on regulating OpR and an in-
crease in the regulatory burden.10
To form a constructive view on OpR and its regulatory implications, it
is necessary to review the concept of OpR and related issues. This paper
aims to consider the various concepts of OpR and the emerging regula-
tory focuses. While the importance of OpR is abundantly clear, the ensu-
ing regulatory burden can be viewed with some skepticism, since OpR is
likely to incur real term monetary consequences as a result of the Basel
Committee's capital adequacy requirements.
In order to better understand OpR, the next section reviews the vari-
5. Credit risk and market risk are risks that the market can assess with the informa-
tion disclosed and analyzed by market participants.
6. The current discussion on operational risk in the Basel Committee is focused on
the capital charge for operational risk. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVI-
SION, A NEW CAPITAL ADEQUACY FRAMEWORK 15 (1999).
7. Jeff Thompson & Chris Frost, Operational Risk Management: Where to Start?, FIN.
STABILITY REV. 25 (Spring 1997).
8. In a search conducted on March 14, 2002 on Westlaw and Lexis for the terms
"operation risk" and "operational risk," not one document could be found written
exclusively on operational risk. Further, not one of the documents that were re-
trieved had more than a section dedicated to operational risk.
9. HANS-ULRICH DOERIG, OPERATIONAL RISK IN FINANCIAL SERVICES: AN OLD
CHALLENGE IN A NEW ENVIRONMENT 7 (Institut International d'Etudes Ban-
caires, Oct. 2000). The author is the Chief Risk Officer of Credit Suisse Group.
10. Operational risk has been the subject of a conference at the Federal Reserve Bank
of Chicago and various consultancies are offering their services on it as well. See
FED. RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO, OPERATIONAL RISK, at www.chicagofed.org/
bankinforeg/bankregulation/opsrisk.cfm (last visited Mar. 13, 2003).
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ous concepts of OpR.a1 The third section analyzes the Basel Committee's
recent endeavors to assess OpR. In the fourth section, a series of regula-
tory approaches to OpR are examined. The fifth section appraises the
issues related to the regulatory treatment of OpR. This paper concludes
by providing a subjective view on OpR and proposing measures that may
enhance the safety and soundness of the financial system through ade-
quate evaluation of OpR.
I. THE CONCEPT OF OPR
A. DEFINITIONS OF OPR
OpR is generally defined as "the risk of losses resulting from inade-
quate systems, controls or human error."'1 2 The Basel Committee has
redefined OpR as "the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed
internal processes, people and systems or from external events.' 3 The
problem with OpR is that the definitions are broad and overlap with
other risks that a financial institution faces. 14 Many financial institutions
do not manage OpR as an independent risk, instead classifying any risk
not categorized as credit or market risk, as OpR. 15 Some financial institu-
tions may include model risk in the definition of OpR, enlarging OpR in
a comprehensive conceptual framework. Model risk is the risk of loss that
may emanate from the inappropriate use of modeling techniques for non-
vanilla 16 and highly structured transactions.1 7 This may be appropriate for
financial institutions whose transactions are heavily geared towards
highly structured products.
When OpR is defined as risks that are not credit risk or market risk,
the equation would be as follows:
OpR = Total risk - Credit risk - Market risk
This definition of OpR includes risks such as strategic risk and reputa-
tional risk that are not included in the proposed Basel definition. This is
because the definition of the Basel Committee focuses on the cause of
11. Some writers refer to operational risk as "operation risk" but for the sake of con-
sistency, this paper uses the term "operational risk" following the example of the
Basel Committee.
12. GROUP OF THIRTY, GLOBAL DERIVATIVES: PRACTICES AND PRINCIPLES (July
1993).
13. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, WORKING PAPER ON THE REOU-
LATORY TREATMENT OF OPERATIONAL RISK 2 (Sept. 2002)
14. This was recognized in the early stage of Basel's work on operational risk. BASEL
COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 3, at 3.
15. Id.
16. Non Plain Vanilla Swaps are an agreement between two or more parties to ex-
change a fixed rate of interest (cash flows equal to interest at a predetermined
fixed rate on a notional principal amount) for a floating rate of interest over a
specified period of time. The market level of the floating rate is typically LIBOR
(London Interbank Offered Rate). The currencies of the two sets of interest cash
flows are the same. This is also known as a pay-fixed swap.
17. Operational Risk Management Issues, CAPITAL MARKETS NEWS (Federal Bank of
Chicago), June 2001, at 6.
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operational losses. 18 It is likely that the above equation that led to a sim-
plified definition of OpR was the result of the Basel Committee's previ-
ous bundling of all risks other than credit and market risk into one. The
1988 Capital Accord 19 of the Basel Committee can be interpreted as be-
littling the significance of OpR by, in practice, defining it as the residual
of total risks from credit and market risk.20 To rectify this position, the
Basel Committee put forward the view that the 8 percent capital ade-
quacy ratio was meant to cover operational risk as well, although no ex-
plicit measurement was provided until it proposed an amendment to the
Capital Accord in 1999.21
Ultimately, the definition that each financial institution adopts in terms
of operational risk will depend on the risk profile of each institution. It is
likely that provided the Basel Committee's definition of OpR is accepted,
no financial institution will use a narrower definition such as "risk that is
managed by the risk management office."' 22 Giving OpR such a narrow
definition would lead to insufficient capital coverage relative to the pro-
posed Basel capital requirement. Individual financial institutions may
adopt a broader definition than that of the Basel Committee, depending
on their activities and their riskiness.
B. RATIONALE FOR REGULATING OPR
The regulatory treatment of OpR is part of the "preventive regulation"
that regulators require for the safety and soundness of the financial sys-
tem. By maintaining a reasonable level of OpR, financial institutions are
able to enjoy the confidence of the markets, and the financial system will
benefit from less systemic risk posed by financial institutions. The regula-
tion of OpR is viewed as forming part of this preventive regulation as
opposed to the regulation for the management of financial fragility.23
Bank regulation is aimed at preserving the safety of the financial sys-
tem and managing any systemic risks. Prudential regulation seeks to safe-
guard the safety and soundness of financial institutions vis-A-vis
18. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT: OP-
ERATIONAL RISK - SUPPORTING DOCUMENT TO THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL Ac-
CORD 2 (Jan. 2001).
19. BASEL COMMITFEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE
OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS (July 1988) [hereinafter
INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE]. The 1988 Basel Accord only included credit risk
but subsequent agreements led to the inclusion of market risk in 1996. BASEL
COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, AMENDMENT TO THE CAPITAL ACCORD
TO INCORPORATE MARKET RISK (Jan. 1996) [hereinafter AMENDMENT TO THE
CAPITAL ACCORD].
20. The 1988 Capital Accord requires an overall capital adequacy level of 8 percent of
total risk-weighed assets for internationally active banks.
21. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 6.
22. See DOERIG, supra note 9.
23. Regulation for the management of financial fragility consists of prompt correct
action and early structural intervention, as well as bank restructuring measures.
See MAMIKO YOKOI-ARAI, FINANCIAL STABILITY ISSUES: THE CASE OF EAST
ASIA § 2.2 (2002).
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depositors.2 4 Systemic regulation ensures the safety and soundness of fi-
nancial institutions for systemic concerns, especially in relation to the so-
cial cost that a failure of a financial institution can cause.2 5 OpR is
primarily regulated for the purpose of prudential reasons. It is necessary
for a financial institution to maintain a level of OpR that will not deplete
its profits and subsequently its capital base.2 6 Appropriate OpR manage-
ment will also enhance the confidence of the financial and capital
markets.
It is not often that OpR leads to a systemic threat, but it is not unheard
of. When a financial institution accumulates losses as a result of bad OpR
management and this results in the failure of that institution, there may
be systemic repercussions. If the failed institution is large or if its OpR
management problem is viewed as common among others, the failure
could lead to loss of confidence in other institutions. For example, if the
risk culture prevailing in the market is not prudent, the OpR manage-
ment of other institutions may be tainted by this tendency. The failure of
Barings could have been described as such an occasion. 27 Although the
failure of Barings did not lead to intervention by the Bank of England, as
either a lender of last resort function or with a bail-out package, there
were significant systemic concerns at the Bank of England.28 This indi-
cates the possibility that if OpR is not managed appropriately, it might
spin into a systemic risk.
C. ELEMENTS OF OR
OpR can be categorized into five elements: people, structure,
processes, systems, and external. Large losses that result from OpR are
usually not the result of a single element but a combination of multiple
elements.
People are a key factor for OpR management. The understanding of
those involved in OpR management is essential, and the risk culture of an
institution to seek unnecessary risk needs to be contained. Both employer
and employee are required to work with integrity and honesty, and the
underlying corporate culture will strongly influence their attitudes.
24. GOODHART ET AL., FINANCIAL REGULATION: WHY, HOW AND WHERE NOW? 5
(1998).
25. Id.
26. When banks experience losses, the first source of liquidity it will resort to is its
profits, and subsequently its capital. Then the capital is eroded sufficiently, the
bank will be in threat of insolvency given that banks are operated on a fractional
reserve system. See YOKoI-ARAI, supra note 23, at Ch. 2, IIA.1(a).
27. Barings, which was one of the oldest establishments in the City of London, col-
lapsed as a result of massive losses incurred by Baring Futures (Singapore) Pte
Ltd. in 1995. The losses were a result of unauthorized proprietary trading in ex-
change financial derivatives by Nick Leeson. Joseph J. Norton & Christopher D.
Olive, Globalization of Financial Risks and International Supervision of Banks and
Securities Firms: Lessons from the Barings Debacle, 10 INT'L L. 301, 305 (1996).
28. The Bank of England decided not to rescue Barings because the losses had ex-
ceeded its capital. RosA MARIA LASTRA, CENTRAL BANKING AND BANKING REG-
ULATION 129 (1996).
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OpR also involves control of remuneration to employees, which in re-
cent years has maintained a steady rise with the boom in the stock mar-
kets. 29 It is essential that financial institutions retain high caliber staff to
manage OpR appropriately. 30 At the same time, remuneration plans that
are too closely linked with profits can cause increased OpR. 3 1 The strong
link between profitability and bonuses is said to have contributed to the
failure of Barings. 32 While employees need the incentive to make profits,
there is an equally felt need to balance that with the knowledge that bo-
nuses can create significant short-term risks. Financial institutions can
control this risk by balancing the compensation system so as to reward
medium to longer-term profits.
Structure encompasses corporate governance, communication, and
outsourcing. Financial institutions have tended to leave the management
of OpR to line managers which, in effect, limits the risk exposure of se-
nior management. 33 This is now evolving with the recognition of the im-
portance of OpR management. Generally, a two-level management
framework is recommended: business line ownership (bottom-up ap-
proach), and centralized macro-management by the risk management de-
partment (top-down approach). 34 Structuring OpR control over the two
levels is important for sound management.
A good operational structure will influence the incentive structure of
the financial institution. It has been identified that poor internal govern-
ance was a factor for most instances of unsound operations of banks.35
When internal controls of financial institutions are weak and prudential
regulation lax, line managers and senior management have less incentive
to operate soundly. The scope of this moral hazard will increase when
management is not responsible for controlling OpR and governments
have a policy of "non-failure" or "too big to fail" for financial institutions.
For OpR to be well managed, senior management need to be "bought-in"
or participate in OpR management.36 Regulators need to scrutinize man-
agement with the "fit and proper" test.37
29. A remuneration policy has a large role as a management tool. "If large bonuses
are paid to employees who make money but have a cavalier approach to compli-
ance, it is likely to encourage similar behaviour in others." Daniel Davies, Remu-
neration and Risk, FIN. STABILITY REV. (Bank of England), Spring 1997, at 18.
30. BASEL COMMIFiEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, RISK MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES
FOR DERIVATIVES 20 (July 1994).
31. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, SOUND PRACTICES FOR THE MAN-
AGEMENT AND SUPERVISION OF OPERATIONAL RISK 6 (Dec. 2001).
32. Brandon Becker & Franqois-lhor Mazur, Risk Management of Financial Derivative
Products: Who's Responsible for What? 21 J. CORP. L. 177, 188 (1995).
33. The Decline of Decentralized OpR Management Civilization, CAPITAL MARKETS
NEWS (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago), June 2001.
34. Operational Risk Management Issues, CAPITAL MARKETS NEWS (Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago), June 2001, at 7.
35. This was investigated through the analysis of banking vulnerabilities of IMF mem-
ber countries. CARL-JOHAN LINDGREN ET AL., BANK SOUNDNESS AND
MACROECONOMIC POLICY, 106-08 (1996).
36. See Operational Risk Management Issues, supra note 34, at 7.
37. See infra Part IV.A.
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The restructuring of internal controls has been a key area of bank re-
structuring in countries that experienced banking crisis. 38 Key elements
of operational restructuring are listed as following:39
" Formulating a business plan that focuses on core products and
competencies;
" Reducing operating costs by cutting staff and eliminating
branches where appropriate, ceasing unprofitable activities, and
disposing of unproductive assets;
* Implementing new technology and improving systems of account-
ing, asset valuation, and internal controls and audits;
* Establishing and enforcing internal procedures for risk pricing,
credit assessment and approval, monitoring the condition of bor-
rowers, ensuring payment of interest and principal, and active
loan recovery; and,
* Creating internal incentive structures to align the interests of di-
rectors, managers, and staff with those of the owners.
The role that processes play in OpR is great. With the daily, prudent
processing of financial transactions, control of OpR can be greatly im-
proved. Normally, financial transactions and their documentation are
double checked to ensure their accuracy. This is standard practice not
only by financial institutions but also in any corporate environment. The
level of authorization for each transaction should be clearly noted in in-
ternal procedures. When these simple steps are not followed, OpR can
become easily apparent. The simplicity of these steps belies the danger of
skipping those steps. Lack of adequate processing can also lead to failure
to comply with regulations. 40 Legal risks become involved in procedure
integrity.
The fact that finance is made dependent on information technology
creates another form of OpR; OpR, or system risk, materializes when a
breach of computer systems, networks or technologies occurs. This is well
reflected in the Consultancy Paper of the Financial Services Authority. 41
There it is pointed out that "the increasing automation of systems and our
reliance on IT has the potential to transform risks from minor manual
processing errors to major systematic failures. ' 42 Whereas OpR previ-
ously focused on the manual reconciliation of the front and back office, it
now lies with the integrity of the operating system and its information
security. 43
External causes of OpR can range from fraud to natural disasters. 44
While the cause of external events involve other OpR elements, such as
38. WILLIAM E. ALEXANDER ET AL., SYSTEMIC BANK RESTRUCTURING AND
MACROECONOMIC POLICY 61 (1997).
39. Id. at 62.
40. See DOERIG, supra note 9, at 20.
41. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., OPERATIONAL RISK SYSTEMS AND CONTROLS (Consultative Pa-
per No. 142, July 2002).
42. Id. at 14.
43. See Operational Risk Management Issues, supra note 34, at 7.
44. See Doerig, supra note 9, at 21.
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system and procedure failure, the primary cause is often the external
event itself.
D. MEASUREMENTS OF OPR
Measurement of OpR has been carried out by various financial institu-
tions, but a consensus on methodology has yet to emerge. 45 Measuring
OpR has become an important focus of OpR as a result of the proposed
capital charges on OpR by the Basel Committee 46 and because of the
desire to reduce operational costs. 47 If a financial institution is capable of
developing a credible measurement of OpR, it may be able to use the
Advanced Measurement Approach of the Basel Committee.48 This will
allow financial institutions to minimize the capital charges for OpR ac-
cording to their risk profile. Measuring OpR can be roughly categorized
into the top-down approach and the bottom-up approach.4 9 The top-
down approach is measured by the use of a variable such as financial
indexes and profit.50 Data can be easily collected for this approach. The
bottom-up approach is based on collecting data of loss events in each
business line. The bottom-up approach consists of the matrix approach
that has been adopted by the Basel Committee. 51 The matrix approach
enables financial institutions to identify which event entails the greatest
impact and which business line is most susceptible to OpR.52 The data is
then analyzed, enabling models to be created according to that data.
However, the nature of OpR and the immaturity of measurement
methodology make it difficult for financial institutions to depend solely
on quantitative measurement tools to assess OpR. Qualitative assessment
of OpR will remain a key component of supervision; 53 some regulators
have already explicitly stated this in their policy.5 4
II. BASEL TREATMENT OF OPERATION RISK
A. PROPOSAL FOR A NEW CAPITAL ACCORD
In June 1999, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision embarked
on a revision of its Capital Accord, 55 publishing a consultative package on
45. JOSE A. LOPEZ, WHAT IS OPERATIONAL RISK? (FRBSF Economic Letter Number
2002-02, Jan. 25, 2002).
46. See infra Part III.
47. TosHIHIKO MORI, ET AL., MEASURING OPERATIONAL RISK IN JAPANESE MAJOR
BANKS (Bank of Japan Financial and Payment System Office Working Paper, July
14, 2000) available at http://www.boj.or.jp/en/ronbun/fwp0001.htm.
48. See infra Part III.
49. See e.g., MORI, supra note 47.
50. Id.
51. See infra Part III. B.
52. See LOPEZ, supra note 45.
53. The Basel Committee makes the test of qualitative assessment the condition for
using the more sophisticated approaches to capital adequacy for OpR. See infra
Part III.
54. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 41, at 17.
55. AMENDMENT TO THE CAPITAL ACCORD, supra note 19.
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the new proposed Accord. 56 The objective of the proposals was to pro-
vide a framework that is more sensitive and responsive to risks. In view of
the complexity and sophistication of internationally active banks, it pro-
posed a menu of approaches to measuring regulatory capital. This was
intended to offer greater flexibility and comprehensiveness to regulatory
capital while simplifying the framework of its measuring.57
The proposals related to OpR are part of the First Pillar of the new
Accord. 58 The first pillar consists of menus of approaches to measure
credit risk and OpR. The measurement for market risk remains un-
changed. The three risks comprise the denominator of the equation that
calculates the capital adequacy ratio.5 9
Previously, OpR was not proposed as part of the Capital Accord.
While the 1988 Capital Accord only set a capital requirement for credit
risk, it was intended that the overall capital requirement cover other risks
as well.60 In 1996, market risk was given separate capital charges.61 This
revision was the first attempt by the Basel Committee to introduce spe-
cific capital charges for OpR.
B. OPR IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE NEW PROPOSALS
The Basel Committee initiated work on OpR in 1998. The Risk Man-
agement Sub-group conducted research by interviewing major interna-
tional banks on the treatment of OpR, and it concluded that allocating
regulatory capital charges to OpR was an effective means to create an
incentive for better management of OpR.62 This conclusion is also
deemed as the Basel Committee's recognition that OpR can be substan-
tial.63 The approaches to OpR are intended to make a better approxima-
tion of the actual level of OpR rather than create a buffer for overall
banking risks.64
56. See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 6.
57. The Basel Committee has admitted that while the new Accord has resulted in be-
ing less prescriptive, it has also increased the complexity of the framework. See
BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 2, at 2.
58. Of the three pillars that construct the new Accord, the first pillar consists of mini-
mum capital requirement, the second pillar of supervisory review process, and the
third pillar of market discipline.
59. Capital adequacy ratio is calculated by: bank's capital ratio (minimum 8%) = (total
capital) / (credit risk + market risk + operational risk)
60. The 1988 Capital Accord set forth the method of measuring capital, the numerator
of the capital adequacy ratio and only mentions that risks other than credit risk
should be taken into account when assessing capital adequacy. See INTERNA-
TIONAL CONVERGENCE supra note 19, $ 8. Operational risk and market risk are
not specifically mentioned, but were subsequently examined by the Basel Commit-
tee. Operational risk was first considered by the Basel Committee in 1994. See
BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 30.
61. AMENDMENT TO THE CAPITAL ACCORD , supra note 19.
62. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 3, at 3.
63. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 18, at 1.
64. The capital buffer introduced by the 1988 Capital Accord implies that the buffer
covers credit and other risks.
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Through th study in 1998, various aspects of OpR were identified. 65
The new Capital Accord proposals build upon the findings of the 1998
report. The findings of this report stress the need for data on the cost of
loss events related to OpR. 66 This data would be used to measure OpR,
which requires the estimation of the "probability of an operational loss
event and the potential size of loss. ' 67
The activities of the Risk Management Group of the Basel Committee
have concentrated on collecting from banks data relative to the losses
experienced for operational incidents in order to reach an agreement on
the definition of OpR, and to contemplate the appropriate risk exposure
for each component of OpR. This was conducted though the "Quantita-
tive Impact Study" (QIS) distributed by the Basel Committee in April
2001.68 The objective of the QIS was to grasp the impact that the newly
proposed capital requirements would have upon banks.
The OpR component of the QIS identified OpR losses over the period
of 1998 to 2001. Banks were obliged to classify operational losses into
eight business lines and seven categories of loss events. Loss events were
further categorized into twenty-one sub-categories of loss event types. 69
The detail of loss events makes clear the intent of the regulators to
have banks scrutinize their operations and identify the weak and strong
areas that call for appropriate capital charges depending on the risk expo-
sure to each loss event.
The data collected creates a vast database on the losses that banks have
experienced in each business line. 70 Through this information, the Basel
Committee is attempting to develop the appropriate framework for mea-
suring OpR and the subsequent regulatory capital within the overall
framework of capital adequacy. 71
C. CAPITAL CHARGE FOR OPR
It was initially proposed that OpR would compose 20 percent of the
overall regulatory capital. 72 However, as a result of industry comments,
the ratio of OpR to the overall regulatory capital charge has now been
65. The 1998 report discusses management oversight, risk management and role of
supervisor. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 3.
66. See id. at 4.
67. Id.
68. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, QUANTITATIVE IMPACT STUDY
(QIS): QIS QUESTIONNAIRE (Apr. 10, 2001) (The Quantitative Impact Study was
carried out in a more limited style in 2000).
69. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 13, Annex 2, at 21.
70. Although this database is not comprehensive enough to provide an adequate pic-
ture of the operational risk losses, it is perhaps one of the widest ranging databases
available.
71. Through the QIS, the Basel Committee intends to identify the appropriate regula-
tory capital for operational risk and at the same time specify the level of capital
required for credit and market risk. As a result, it is intended that the capital
charges for credit and market risk will decrease. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING
SUPERVISION, QIS2-OPERATIONAL RISK Loss DATA- 4 MAY 2001 2 (May 4, 2001).
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reduced to 12 percent, which is envisaged to reflect a more realistic view
of OpR.
73
This implies that for every asset, 0.96 percent of capital must be put
aside to satisfy the regulatory requirement for OpR.74 This is the minimal
level, provided that the minimum regulatory capital for OpR is 12 per-
cent of the overall regulatory capital and a capital adequacy ratio of 8
percent. Because internationally active banks usually maintain a higher
level of capital adequacy ratio, they are likely to put 1.1 to 1.3 percent of
their asset aside for regulatory capital purposes.75 This is a significant risk
factor for OpR, demonstrating a considerable level of losses experienced
by banks from OpR.
D. THREE APPROACHES TO MEASURING OPR
The Basel Committee has proposed three frameworks for measuring
OpR: the basic indicator approach (BIA), the standardized approach,
and the advanced measurement approach (AMA). 76 The BIA is envis-
aged for use by smaller banks with a simple range of business activities. 77
OpR capital is calculated by linking a single indicator to a fixed percent-
age. The Basel Committee has proposed to use gross income for the indi-
cator and 17 to 20 percent as the capital requirement for OpR.78 Due to
the simplicity of the BIA, supervisors are not likely to permit internation-
ally active banks and banks with significant OpR exposure to apply the
BIA for their OpR capital.79
The Standardized Approach goes a step further in refining the ap-
proach to OpR losses specific to the bank. The bank's activities are di-
vided into business lines, and for each business line an indicator to reflect
the size or volume of the bank's activity is identified. For the sake of
simplicity and lack of evidence of greater risk sensitivity in other indica-
73. BASEL COMMIT-rEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 13, at 3.
74. This is calibrated for internationally active banks that have a capital requirement
of 8 percent of assets, and provided that operational risk is 12 percent of this over-
all capital.
75. This is based on the assumption that internationally active banks have a capital
adequacy ratio of 9 to 11 percent.
76. The Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA) was initially proposed as the In-
ternal Measurement Approach (IMA) in the Consultative Document, but was sub-
sequently modified to AMA. This was due to the lack of measurement experience
of operational risk in the industry and the lack of data to support any specific
approach to internal measurement of operational risk was inappropriate. BASEL
COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 13, at 5.
77. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 18, at 6.
78. Id. The Basel Committee initially proposed a 30 percent of gross income for opera-
tional risk capital in its Consultative Document. However, as a result of the QIS,
many banks commented that this would actually lead to an increased level of over-
all capital. As a result, the Basel Committee is now proposing a 17 to 20 percent
level of gross income. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note
13, at 4.
79. Id. at 11.
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tors, gross income is employed as the indicator for all business lines.8 0
For each business line, the supervisor determines a capital charge that
would be a percentage of the indicator, in this case gross income, reflect-
ing the OpR loss experienced in the given business line. The summation
of the capital charges across the business lines is the total capital charge
for OpR. In order to qualify for the Standardized Approach a bank must
meet the qualifying criteria set out by the supervisor. The qualifying crite-
ria consist of effective risk management and control, and of measurement
and validation of OpR.81
The AMA is the most sophisticated among the three proposed ap-
proaches, and it relies on the internal risk measurement of OpR losses by
the bank. It is the most risk sensitive and is likely to decrease the regula-
tory capital requirement for OpR. Banks would be permitted to use their
internal OpR measurement system, subject to qualitative and quantita-
tive standards. The risk estimated would be subject to a floor level, which
is a certain percentage of the OpR capital of the Standardized Approach.
It is proposed that the floor will be set at 75 percent of the Standardized
Approach's capital charge subject to periodic revisions.8 2
The qualifying and quantitative standards form an important require-
ment of the AMA. The qualifying criteria would address the bank's OpR
management environment, processes, and risk control efforts.8 3 The
quantitative standards would include a supervisory soundness standard
that all internally generated risk estimates would be required to meet.84
The bank would have to be able to identify the losses from OpR over the
past five years.8 5
E. QUALITATIVE MANAGEMENT OF OPR
To supplement the new Capital Accord proposals and the process of
calibrating OpR losses, the Basel Committee has proposed a paper on the
"Sound Practices for the Management and Supervision of Operational
Risk" (Sound Practices).8 6 This guideline is part of both Pillars 1 and 2 of
80. Initially in the Consultative Document, the indicator for each business line varied
between gross income, annual average assets, annual settlement throughput, and
total funds under management. BASEL COMMIIFEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION,
supra note 18, at 7. However, as a result of the QIS, the proposal was simplified to
only use gross income as the indicator for the Standardized Approach. Id.
81. Id. at 11.
82. Id. at 6.
83. See id. Annex 1 at 16.
84. See id. Annex 1 at 18.
85. See id. Annex 1 at 19, point (1).
86. See BASEL COMMITFEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, SOUND PRACTICES FOR THE
MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISION OF OPERATIONAL RISK (July 2002) [hereinafter
SOUND PRACTICES] (revises an early version of this paper, titled the same, dated
December 2001). The revisions made in the July 2002 version reflect industry con-
cern over being tied to adopt strategies or taking specific actions. Also, the "mea-
surement" of OpR has been changed to "assessment" so as to eradicate the use of
quantitative measurements which to date are not satisfactory. See supra Part II.D.
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the new Capital Accord proposals.8 7 It provides a process of supervisory
review of OpR and clarifies the OpR management system required by a
bank.
Developing an OpR management system and creating an environment
that adheres to safety and soundness standards is essential for banks to
qualify for any of the three approaches to measure OpR. Further, the
principles in Sound Practices encourages banks to dedicate greater re-
sources for effective OpR management and compliments the work on
minimum regulatory capital for OpR. The principles of the Sound Prac-
tices are provided in the Annex of this paper.
The Sound Practices stress the role of management in overseeing an
adequate risk management system for OpR.88 The culture of manage-
ment is viewed as essential for banks to continuously develop a robust
risk management system for any risk. This is related to the structure of
corporate governance for OpR management and the human element dis-
cussed above.
Various elements crucial in developing a robust OpR management sys-
tem are identified in Principles 4-7. OpR should be identified not only for
all business lines, but also for all products, activities, processes, and sys-
tems of banks. Banks need to implement systems and processes that ade-
quately monitor and control these aspects on an ongoing basis. This is
related to the element of processes and systems discussed above.
The roles of supervisors are provided in Principles 8 and 9. Supervisors
need to examine the appropriateness of the banks' approaches to those
issues raised in Principles 1-7, namely, the management involvement in
OpR monitoring and the development of an adequate OpR management
system. Supervisors are recommended to require banks to manage OpR
in these aspects and to establish a section managing OpR.
Principle 10 is related to disclosure of OpR exposure, which is a con-
tentious issue in relation to Pillar 3 of the new Capital Accord proposal.
While banks are required to publicly disclose their OpR exposure and
quality of their OpR management system in Principle 10, there has been
strong opposition to the disclosure of OpR loss data. 89
Pillar 3 of the new Capital Accord proposal seeks to introduce greater
market discipline into capital adequacy regulations by enhanced disclo-
sure. 90 For OpR, the following risk disclosure requirements have been set
out:
This precludes any information on OpR losses although the inclusion
could be subject to future discussion.
87. Pillar 2 of the new Capital Accord proposal requires supervisors to ensure that
each bank has sound internal processes in place to assess the adequacy of its capi-
tal based on a thorough evaluation of its risks. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING
SUPERVISION, supra note 2, at 5.
88. See SOUND PRACTICES, supra note 86, at 4-5.
89. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 13, at 13.
90. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 2, at 5.
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FIGURE 2: DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS FOR OPR*
QUALITATIVE The approaches for OpR capital assessment that the bank is qualified
DISCLOSURES for.
The OpR management objectives and policies, including:
- strategies and processes;
- the structure and organization of the risk management function;
- the scope and nature of risk reporting and/or measurement systems;
and
- policies for hedging and/or mitigating risk and strategies and
processes for monitoring the continuing effectiveness of hedges/
mitigants.
Description of the AMA used by the bank.
QUANTITATIVE OpR capital charge per business line (if available).
DISCLOSURES
* BASEL COMMITEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 13, at 13.
F. PROGRESS MADE BY THE NEW CAPITAL ACCORD
Collecting OpR loss data results in greater awareness among the bank
management of the level of OpR risk exposure that banks face. The loss
data of the QIS indicates that most OpR loss events arise in the retail
banking unit.9 1 The primary reason why the OpR of retail banking is so
large is that the event type entailing the greatest number of loss event is
external fraud. However, when the aggregate loss of each business line is
analyzed, the losses are more balanced, although the loss in retail banking
is still the greatest.92
While the findings of the QIS in terms of loss data have been viewed
with caution, 93 the overview is consistent with the general impression of
OpR. Loss events that occur frequently have a smaller loss in each event,
while loss events that occur infrequently have a greater loss in each indi-
vidual incident. Nevertheless, both frequent and infrequent events are
significant because the gross loss is largely similar. The focus of OpR
management will be on a judgment by management based on loss data.
The development of loss data will enable a bank to develop the appro-
priate strategy for its operations. If the loss is concentrated in one busi-
ness line, OpR management needs to be enhanced in this area. Principles
1-3 of Sound Practices and the findings of the QIS, although crude, allow
banks to reconsider their OpR management strategy so as to devise the
strategy most appropriate to the overall management approach.
The progress in terms of agreement on the new Capital Accord frame-
work has not been substantial. The date of agreement has been post-
91. 2/3 of the loss events are within the retail banking area. BASEL COMMITrEE ON
BANKING SUPERVISION, THE QUANTITATIVE IMPACT STUDY FOR OPERATIONAL
RISK: OVERVIEW OF INDIVIDUAL Loss DATA AND LESSONS LEARNED 7 (Jan.
2002).
92. Id. at 8.
93. The limitation is related to number of banks and consistency of the reporting. Id.
at 6.
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poned to allow further discussion within each country. 94
III. REGULATORY TREATMENT OF OPR
While the Basel Committee is in the process of consulting the regula-
tory treatment of OpR, in this section, OpR is considered in terms of
current regulation and supervision.95
In terms of international standards, the International Organization of
Securities Commissions (IOSCO) proposed the role of regulators for
OpR management in 1994.96 The significance of this document is that it
puts forth the view that while certain risks can be regulated by market
discipline, operational and financial risk need to be regulated and ade-
quately managed. 97 This is consistent with the view that the difficulty in
managing OpR poses limitations on market discipline. 98 The IOSCO doc-
ument hesitates to be prescriptive, given the diversity of practices in the
various jurisdictions.99 Its approach is rather to list various regulatory ap-
proaches that can be adopted by securities regulators.100
The supervisory trend of industrialized countries is evolving from bal-
ance sheet assessments to risk-based analysis. The Federal Reserve has
moved towards a risk-based approach for its large and complex banking
organizations. 10 The Interim Prudential Sourcebook for Banks of the Fi-
nancial Services Authority has a risk-based approach,' 0 2 and the Japanese
Financial Services Agency's supervisory manual is categorized by risk.10 3
This risk-based approach to supervision has prompted various regulators
to re-examine their approach to OpR.
Through the examination of the supervisory manuals of various coun-
tries, regular components subject to OpR supervision emerge. The main
items are essentially those subject to regulation by most supervisors. The
additional items refer to other items whose practice varies among
supervisors.
It is important to note that although OpR is increasingly the focus of
supervision, OpR is not explicitly addressed in supervisory manuals. For
94. On July 10, 2002, the Basel Committee reached an agreement on the timetable of
finalizing the new Capital Accord by the end of 2003 and for implementation by
the end of 2006.
95. Considerations on regulatory treatment of operational risk by the Basel Commit-
tee on Banking Supervision since January 2001 are considered in Section 1I1.
96. TECHNICAL COMMITFEE OF IOSCO, OPERATIONAL AND FINANCIAL RISK MAN-
AGEMENT CONTROL MECHANISMS FOR OVER-THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES Ac-
TIVITIES OF REGULATED SECURITIES FIRMS (1994).
97. Id. 5.
98. See supra Part I.
99. TECHNICAL COMMITTEE OF IOSCO, supra note 96, 9 10.
100. Id. App. B.
101. Div. OF BANKING SUPERVISION AND REGULATION , BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE
FED. RESERVE Sys., RISK-FoCUSED SUPERVISION OF LARGE COMPLEX BANKING
ORGANIZATIONS (SR Letter 99-15, June 23, 1999).
102. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., INTERIM PRUDENTIAL SOURCEBOOK FOR BANKS (June 2001).
103. FIN. SERVS. AGENCY JAPAN, SUPERVISORY MANUAL OF DEPOSITORY INSTITU-
TIONS (June 2001).
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TABLE 3: ITEMS SUBJECT TO SUPERVISION FOR OPR*
Main items Role of Board member/senior Recognition of role related to exam-
management ining OpR.
Procedural adequacy To ensure OpR is examined regularly
and the independence of each section
is secured.
Internal audit The role and plans of internal audit.
Additional items Staffing Quality of staff in terms of integrity.
External audit The role and plans of external audit.
Systems Integrity of systems and information
security.
Business continuity management 'Contingency plan for various internal
and external events.
* See OFFICE OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF FIN. INSTS. CANADA, STANDARD OF SOUND BUSINESS
AND FINANCIAL PRACTICES-INTERNAL CONTROL (Guideline No. F-11, Feb. 1998); Div. OF
BANKING SUPERVISION AND REGULATION , Bo. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS.,
COMMERCIAL BANK EXAMINATION MANUAL (Fourth Printing, March 1994): FIN. SERVS.
AGENCY JAPAN, SUPERVISORY MANUAL OF DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS, (June 2001); FIN.
SERVS. AUTH., OPERATIONAL RISK SYSTEMS AND CONTROLS (Consultative Paper No. 142, July
2002).
example, CAMEL rating system of the Federal Reserve System does not
include the adequacy of OpR per se,10 4 while the more recently devel-
oped CAMELOT contemplates this aspect.'0 5 CAMELOT has been de-
veloped by the Canadian Office of Superintendent of Financial
Institutions, adding the quality of Operations and Treasury management
to CAMEL.10 6 OpR regulation is embedded in the supervisory process in
many cases.
A. BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND SENIOR MANAGEMENT
All supervisory manuals stress the importance of the role that board
members play in controlling OpR. Board members (or directors) are pri-
marily responsible for effective OpR controls, and they should have a
clear understanding and recognition of OpR. They have a duty to install
an internal control environment that adheres to OpR management.10 7 In
104. CAMEL was developed in 1979 by the Federal Reserve System (FRS) and the
Office of Currency Comptroller (OCC) to rate the financial performance of banks
in the U.S. and is formally called the Uniform Financial Institutions Rating Sys-
tem. CAMEL is an acronym of its five items, namely Capital adequacy, Asset qual-
ity, Management, Earnings, and Liquidity. Each item is assigned a rating of 1-5
which is aggregated into a composite rate. See Rebel A. Cole et al., FIMS: A New
Monitoring System for Banking Institutions, 81 FED. RES. BULL. 1 (1995).
105. CAMELOT rates operational risk from the aspect of the fit and properness of
management.
106. Andrew Sheng, Resolution and Reform: Supervisory Remedies for Problem Banks,
in BANK RESTRUCTURING: LESSONS FROM THE 1980s 51 (Andrew Sheng ed.,
1996).
107. See DIV. OF BANKING SUPERVISION AND REGULATION, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF
THE FED. RESERVE SYS., COMMERCIAL BANK EXAMINATION MANUAL § 2020.1
(Supp. May 14, 2001); OFFICE OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF FIN. INSTS. CANADA,
STANDARD OF SOUND BUSINESS AND FINANCIAL PRACTICES-INTERNAL CON-
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common law jurisdictions, it is considered a fiduciary duty of board mem-
bers to act in the best interest of the company, which is concurrent with
this supervisory requirement. 10 8
It is also the duty of board members to ensure compliance with laws,
regulations, and rules. 109 It is obvious that this task should form the basis
of any institution's safety and soundness policy. Any OpR control policy
should be formulated to enhance the objectives of laws, regulations, and
rules.
Senior management assumes the important function of implementing
the OpR controls decided by the board, with its responsibility for ensur-
ing the day-to-day running of the OpR controls.110 Some manuals state
the qualities required of senior management accountable for OpR.11
This is related to the "fit and proper" test for the banking management.
B. PROCEDURAL ADEQUACY
Setting out procedures appropriate to the OpR profile of the financial
institution is an essential part of internal controls. An effective OpR envi-
ronment includes not only routine checks, but also reporting to manage-
ment on any irregularities.' 1 2 The existence of procedures does not in
itself ensure an effective internal control. The procedure must be carried
out by competent persons on a daily basis.' 13
Procedures should be formally codified and documented. 114 This in-
cludes the task of defining the level of authority of each person, establish-
ing the division of functional responsibilities to ensure the independence
of each section, and developing an effective management information
system that encompasses appropriate accounting and record-keeping
controls. 1 5
TROL, (Guideline No. F-11, Feb. 1998); FIN. SERFS. AGENCY JAPAN, SUPERVISORY
MANUAL OF DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS, (June 2001), at 121.
108. OFFICE OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF FIN. INSTS. CANADA, supra note 107, at 3.
109. See id.; Div. OF BANKING SUPERVISION AND REGULATION , BD. OF GOVERNORS
OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., COMMERCIAL BANK EXAMINATION MANUAL,
§ 2020.1 (Mar. 1994).
110. See Div. OF BANKING SUPERVISION AND REGULATION, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF
THE FED. RESERVE SyS., supra note 107, § 2020.1; OFFICE OF THE SUPERINTEN-
DENT OF FIN. INSTS. CANADA, supra note 107, at 5: FIN. SERVS. AGENCY JAPAN,
supra note 107 at 121.
111. Qualities required of senior management responsible for operational risk include:
competence, expertise in banking and auditing, integrity and prudence of manage-
ment. See Div. OF BANKING SUPERVISION AND REGULATION, BD. OF GOVERNORS
OF THE FED. RESERVE SyS., supra note 109, § 2020.1; OFFICE OF THE SUPERINTEN-
DENT OF FIN. INSTS. CANADA, supra note 107 at 5.
112. See Div. OF BANKING SUPERVISION AND REGULATION , BD. OF GOVERNORS OF
THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 109, § 2020.1; OFFICE OF THE SUPERINTEN-
DENT OF FIN. INSTS. CANADA, supra note 107 at 5; FIN.SERVS. AGENCY JAPAN,
supra note 107, at 121.
113. See Div. OF BANKING SUPERVISION AND REGULATION, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF
THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 109, § 2010.1.
114. OFFICE OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF FIN. INSTS. CANADA, supra note 107, at 6.
115. Id.
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C. INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL AUDITS
In order for both internal auditing and external auditing to make an
objective assessment of the OpR controls of the institution, both need to
be independent from each section. Not all companies will have an exter-
nal auditor, and some smaller institutions will not have a dedicated inter-
nal audit section. Whatever the situation, auditors should have a clear
mandate, be independent of the section they audit, and have qualified
personnel to carry out the audits. 116
The role of internal and external audit has come under extreme scru-
tiny as a result of the Enron failure. The apparent lack of effective moni-
toring has been discussed in depth. Empowering the audit committee
with greater power to question the accuracy of financial reports will be a
significant development. Some have proposed that non-financial indica-
tors also be subject to audit." 7 Those related to OpR management are:
internal control," 8 worker satisfaction, and education and experience of
workforce and management.'1 19 This would be an interesting development
that would narrow the information asymmetry of the OpR of a financial
institution.
D. OTHER ITEMS SUBJECT TO INTERNAL CONTROL
Hiring staff with the integrity and appropriate expertise is a key ele-
ment in ensuring the appropriateness of internal controls. The personnel
in charge of OpR management needs to have the incentive to act with
integrity. Such incentives are created through regular reporting to senior
management and the board, clear management information systems, and
regular internal and external audits. Acquiring competent and reliable
staff is vital for OpR management, and this can be guaranteed by long-
term human resource plans, development and regular review of compen-
sation programs, and regular personnel evaluation and review.' 20 The
number of staff employed to manage OpR should be commensurate to
the size and scope of the financial institution.
Here, systems refer mainly to IT systems and information security. Not
all regulators have sections on systems in their regulator guidance. The
116. Id. at 16-7; Div. OF BANKING SUPERVISION AND REGULATION, BD. OF GOVER-
NORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys., supra note 107, § 2010.1.
117. Oversight Hearing on "Accounting and Investor Protection Issues Raised by Enron
and Other Public Companies" Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., and
Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. (2002) (statement of Peter J. Wallison, President and
Co-Director, Financial Deregulation Project, American Enterprise Institute); id.
(statement of Robert E. Litan, Director, Economic Studies Program, The Brook-
ings Institution) [hereinafter Litan statement]; Protecting the Public Interest: Se-
lected Governance, Regulatory Oversight, Auditing, Accounting, and Financial
Reporting Issues Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs,
108th Cong. (2002) (statement of David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the
United States), reprinted in GAO-02-483T (2002) [hereinafter Walker statement].
118. Walker statement, supra note 117.
119. Litan statement, supra note 117.
120. All of these considerations are necessary to employ experienced and skilled per-
sons. Id. at 10.
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Financial Services Authority and the Financial Services Agency have ex-
plicit sections in their guidance stating the regulatory stance. 121
As discussed above, 122 on the one hand the automation of processes
and systems through computer systems and information technology have
reduced human errors. On the other hand, it has made financial institu-
tions susceptible to system failures. To prevent possible losses posed by
the system, financial institutions need to report the structure of technol-
ogy operations, the appropriateness of system acquisitions, development
and maintenance, and appropriateness of activities supporting the opera-
tion of IT systems. 23 Further, the establishment of redundant back-up
systems and integrity of information security will have to be
supervised. 124
Business continuity management is related to the contingency manage-
ment system to cope with external events. 125 Various internal and exter-
nal events that may disrupt the operation of the financial institution
should be analyzed, and possible responses to them considered. The three
UK financial regulators have been working together to ensure that busi-
ness continuity is maintained in the London market since the September
11 attacks. The regulators have a website dedicated to the various regula-
tory efforts and corporate responses that should be considered. 26 The
FSA has directed most of its focus on high impact firms which, individu-
ally or collectively, would create the maximum risk to the FSA's objec-
tives. The main areas of FSA's focus have been:
" Physical concentration of principal and backup sites;
* Firms' own business continuity planning including testing;
* Identification of critical business units;
* IT resilience;
* Staffing issues, including identification of key staff, clarification
of responsibilities and succession planning; and
* Communications issues, including the ability to maintain internal
communications as well as the capacity to communicate effec-
tively with the authorities and market counterparties.
It is likely that business continuity will be a key component that regula-
tors will take into consideration to protect the financial stability of their
market and to prevent systemic risk.
IV. ISSUES RELATED TO OPERATION RISK
The significance of OpR is only starting to be realized. When the Basel
Committee's capital requirement for OpR is taken into context, it be-
comes evident that OpR does pose a real risk to financial institutions. The
121. FIN. SERVS. AGENCY JAPAN, supra note 107, at 13; FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note
41, at 8.
122. See supra Part 11.0
123. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 41, at 9.
124. Id.; FIN. SERVS. AGENCY JAPAN, supra note 107, at 132-33.
125. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 41, at 15.
126. See http://www.financialsectorcontinuity.gov.uk.
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proposed capital charge for OpR will require a capital cost of 0.96 per-
cent to each asset. This is a considerable cost to financial institutions. In-
vestigation of supervisory practices reveals the gap between sound
practices for OpR management and the actual supervisory process. OpR
is mainly examined in the context of internal controls and audits for most
regulators. This does not reflect the overall picture of OpR, which covers
various aspects of asset and liability management as well as fraud. 127
While some regulators have proposed detailed guidelines for OpR regu-
lation, this is also not necessarily desirable given the problems involved in
prescriptive regulation. 128
A. COMPLIANCE COST AND REGULATORY BURDEN OF
CAPITAL CHARGE
The compilation of loss data related to OpR is an important step in
comprehending the nature and costs of OpR in each financial institution.
However, the burden on financial institutions to compile such data is vast.
While not denying that QIS conducted by the Basel Committee has been
extremely useful in understanding the real cost effects of OpR, this has
been an expensive exercise for cooperating institutions. Smaller institu-
tions will probably not have the resources available to compile such data.
This justifies the different approaches the Basel Committee has taken to-
wards OpR, although this may also result in smaller institutions having to
pay a higher capital cost.
The compliance cost to implement OpR regulation has been estimated
within the United Kingdom. The IT costs are estimated to be between
GBP 25,000 and 250,000, depending on the size and complexity of the
institution.129 For staffing and consultancy costs, some larger institutions
have already spent GBP 1,250,000 to improve their OpR management. It
is evaluated that small to medium institutions will require GBP 25,000 to
30,000.130 While the variation of total short-term implementation costs is
between GBP 5,000 to GBP 2,000,000, it is likely that financial institu-
tions will require higher expenditure than the minimal estimates. There
are also ongoing fixed costs, which will be required to maintain an im-
proved OpR regime, estimated at 10 to 20 percent of the initial imple-
mentation cost. The cost is not insignificant and needs to be carefully
weighed by regulators. Further, there will be capital charges for OpR
when the Basel Committee has agreed on a regulatory charge. Some pre-
dict that the overall capital adequacy ratio will increase as a result of a
127. See Figure 1, supra, for reference to the various business lines involved in opera-
tional risk.
128. The guideline that the Financial Services Authority has proposed is detailed and
focused on OpR instead of internal controls. However, many of the banks that are
regulated by the guidlines seem to have opposed the detail in which it is written.
FIN. SERVS. AuTH., supra note 41, at 20.
129. Id. at 37.
130. Id. at 38.
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new Capital Accord.1 3 '
While capital charges have aimed at balancing market discipline and
competition, this may be more difficult for OpR. OpR is essentially an
internal issue of an institution, with less apparent rewards for good con-
duct. Disclosure will not necessarily improve the standards of this good
conduct because procedures will only be beneficial if competently carried
out.
One method of bringing in market discipline and competition will be
the disclosure requirements for institutions using Basel's AMA. 132 If in-
stitutions are able to identify their qualitative and quantitative standards,
these would be an indication of better OpR management. This may not
be possible for smaller institutions, but gradual disclosure would signify
the efforts that smaller institutions are investing for a safer operational
environment.
B. RISK CULTURE AND INDIVIDUAL FITNESS AND PROPRIETY
As OpR is essentially human error related, assessing the OpR of each
institution entails a subjective element. This assessment can be enhanced
by the degree to which corporate culture affects human behavior within
the institution. Corporate culture is an implicit factor, but it clearly affects
corporate behavior as a result OpR.1 33 Some claim corporate culture to
be the "single most important criterion in establishing the effectiveness of
operational risk management function."'1 34 Risk culture encompasses the
general awareness of and attitude to risk on the part of the employees of
financial institution. 135 To curb excessive risk taking tendencies in the in-
stitution, various measures can be taken.
The attitude of members of the board towards OpR is a key factor
determining the manner in which OpR is managed. In a recent study of
FTSE 250 companies, it was perceived that board members did not have
a good understanding of risk in general and regard it as an operational
matter. 36 Without the security of full board backing on improving the
risk management strategy, there is little hope that OpR management will
be given adequate consideration.
To address some of these issues, greater compensation for better opera-
tional conduct could be contemplated. This would involve internal audits
assessing the internal control function in greater depth. Second, sanctions
should be introduced for inappropriate risk taking. The FSA has intro-
131. See DOERIG, supra note 9, at 7.
132. See supra Part III.D.
133. Corporate culture had a strong negative effect on the behavior of Enron employ-
ees. See Joshua Chaffin & Stephen Fidler, Enron Revealed to be Rotten to the Core,
FIN. TIMES, April 19, 2002, at 30.
134. Thompson & Frost, supra note 7, at 26.
135. FINANCIAL SERVS. AUTH., supra note 41, Annex, at 4.
136. ROBERT BALDWIN & RICHARD ANDERSON, RETHINKING REGULATORY RISK 15,
17 (London School of Economics, DLA 2002).
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duced a stricter sanction regime that will be discussed below. 37 Third, the
remuneration policy of an institution should not be excessive, as this may
encourage excessive risk taking.138 By introducing remuneration pack-
ages that reward good conduct at a later date, for example, one to two
years ahead, this would, in theory, encourage better OpR management.
Remuneration packages that penalize would also be more beneficial than
simply resorting to dismissing employees. This has been an issue that has
been the subject of discussion in various testimonies related to the Enron
failure.139
The regulatory authorities are also beginning to focus on revamping
corporate culture so as to encourage greater ethical standards within fi-
nancial institutions. The FSA has published a discussion paper on im-
proving the ethical standards of financial services.1 40 It is apparent from
the speeches of the Chairman that the FSA has begun to look at the
"spirit" in which the financial industry operates and not merely compli-
ance of regulations.' 41 This development is also taking place in the
United States with GAO proposing an ethical code for companies to
follow. 14 2
Reading the ethical standard proposed by FSA reminds one of brain-
storming sessions of business schools. But perhaps this is what the finan-
cial industry lacks; guidance on what is good and bad behavior. For one
not accustomed to the litigious nature of Anglo-Saxon culture, the con-
tentious relationship between the consumer and supplier is always sur-
prising. To a non-Anglo-Saxon, it seems the lack of harmony in this
relationship creates a corporate culture that attempts to minimize the
benefits to the consumer. This in turn leads to dwindling ethical
standards.
The FSA has also taken a step in ensuring that those who hold a con-
trolling role in financial institutions are required to be "approved per-
sons. '"143 The "Statement of Principle and Code of Practice for Approved
Persons" is part of the FSA's Handbook of Rules and Guidance within
the High Level Standard. 144 This requires approved persons to be of in-
137. See discussion infra Part V.F.
138. This has also been advocated by the Conference Board, the business research or-
ganization. Andrew Hill, US Panel Launches Executive Pay Fight, FIN. TIMES,
Sept. 18, 2002, at 28.
139. Oversight Hearing on "Accounting and Investor Protection Issues Raised by Enron
and Other Public Companies" Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., and
Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. (2002) (statement of Ira M. Millstein, Senior Partner,
Weil, Gotshal and Manges); Walker statement, supra note 119.
140. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., AN ETHICAL FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL SERVICES (Discus-
sion Paper No. 18, Oct. 2002).
141. Howard Davies, Corporate Governance and the Development of Global Capital
Markets, Address Before the China Securities Regulatory Commission (April 22,
2002) (transcript available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/ubs/speeches/sp96.html).
142. Walker statement, supra note 117.
143. Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, c.8, §§ 57, 62(13) (Eng.).
144. The "Approved Persons regime" is referred to in statute as "APER."
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tegrity, act with due skill, care, and diligence.145 These standards reflect
the ethical discussions that the FSA is leading.
C. OUTSOURCING OPERATIONS
Outsourcing of operations has the effect of both reducing risks and in-
creasing other risks at the same time. Outsourcing has the benefit of tap-
ping specialized expertise that is enhanced by economies of scale. To
remove the cost of certain operations from the balance sheet of financial
institutions, outsourcing has been an effective means of cutting costs.
However, OpR concerns have sparked discussion on the advantages and
disadvantages of outsourcing.
Outsourcing has been increasingly used for operations that are tradi-
tionally performed by internal personnel, such as computer application
development, audit, and mortgage processing.146 This enables financial
institutions to dedicate staff to core activities and to change operational
costs from fixed costs to variable costs, the method suitable for changing
market conditions.
However, outsourcing does not necessarily outsource the OpR in-
volved in the operation. There are various risks induced by outsourcing.
The greatest risk involved is legal risk related to the contractual nature of
outsourcing. Unless the contract with the service provider is well drafted,
the control over the operations of the service provider may be limited, 147
and the flexibility of outsourcing lost.148 It is also possible that the legal
liability may still remain with the financial institution.149 It is important to
recognize that outsourcing will not contract out the regulatory obligations
placed on certain operations. This is explicitly set out in the draft Guide-
line of the Financial Services Authority.150
Another risk is that the dependency on third party service providers
may lead to the inability of a financial institution to conduct these activi-
ties in-house as a result of lost expertise.' 51 It will threaten the continuity
of business when the operation of a service provider fails. This risk is also
related to maintaining adequate control over the outsourced operations.
The reporting structure, the extent to which outsourcing arrangements
support the business strategy,152 and the ensuring of prompt response of
145. Statement of Principle, APER1.2.1G.
146. Rick Harris, Does Outsourcing Reduce op Risk?, OPERATIONAL RISK, Sept. 2001,
at 6.
147. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 41, at 16.
148. If the duration of the contract is lengthy and the business environment changes
during this period, financial institutions may be locked into the outsourcing ar-
rangement. FED. RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, OUTSOURCING FINANCIAL SER-
VICES ACTIVITIES: INDUSTRY PRACTICES TO MITIGATE RISKS 5 (Oct. 1999).
149. This is illustrated with personnel management where legal liability due to lawsuits.
For example, sexual harassment will not exempt the financial institution. Harris,
supra note 146, at 7.
150. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 41, Draft Guideline 3A.7.1.
151. Id. at 16.
152. Id. Draft Guideline 3A.7.4.
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the service provider, 53 are part of what needs to be taken into considera-
tion to efficiently control the service provider.
The third risk is the information security that may be compromised as a
result of outsourcing. Outsourcers are prohibited from disclosing non-
public information learned through their work. 154 Nevertheless, viola-
tions of confidentiality by service providers can lead not only to OpR but
also to legal and reputational risks. 55
The fourth risk is related to the transition phase of outsourcing. 156 As
processes and management structure are being modified to the new out-
sourcing arrangement, training needs to cover for internal staff. If staff
are transferred to the service provider, morale and labor law issues may
arise.
In order to adequately manage the OpR of outsourcing, it is crucial to
understand the result of operations being outsourced, the service pro-
vider's structure and the arrangement with the service provider. The Fi-
nancial Service Authority provides a non-exhaustive checklist when
drafting the contract with the service provider.157 Various phases of out-
sourcing should be considered through a scenario analysis.
D. INSURING AGAINST OPR
It has been recognized in the Basel Committee's Working Paper, "Reg-
ulatory Treatment of Operational Risk," that insurance against opera-
tional losses can mitigate OpR. 58 The insurance community has
published a paper to address the issues of how to deal with insurance of
OpR and how it might be incorporated into the measurement of regula-
tory capital.' 59
Various concerns are related to insurance of OpR when considering
regulatory capital. The first concern is the credit risk of the insurance
company itself.' 60 This would result from the insurance company's fail-
ure; therefore it may be necessary to limit the risk mitigation effect to
those insurance companies that meet a minimum credit rating. 161
Second is the time within which an insurance company needs to pay
claims. 162 The financial strength of the insurer also determines the ability
to pay claims. 163 The insurance industry's response has been that: 164
153. FED. RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, supra note 148, at 5.
154. See Harris, supra note 146, at 6.
155. FED. RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, supra note 148, at 5.
156. Id. at. 6.
157. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 41, Draft Guideline 3A.7.5-8.
158. BASEL COMMITrEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 13, at 4.
159. INSURANCE OF OPERATIONAL RISK UNDER THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD
(Nov. 7, 2001, Working Paper submitted by Insurance Companies).
160. MORI, supra note 47.
161. Id.
162. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 41, Draft Guideline 3A.8.1(1).
163. Id., Guideline 3A.8.1.(2).
164. INSURANCE OF OPERATIONAL RISK UNDER THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD,
supra note 159.
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" The New Accord should recognize standard, commonly pur-
chased insurance contracts 165 as well as more comprehensive, al-
ternative contracts depending on a qualifying criteria.
" Explicit recognition of insurance should be made under each
OpR measurement approach.
" Certain residual risks, such as counterparty risk, scope of cover-
age, and timing of insurance payment, should be accounted for
within the capital measurement.
Financial institutions have used insurance as an effective means to
cover and compensate for operational losses. The issue is not whether
insurance should be taken into account for capital charge calculations but
rather the extent of the charge. The Basel Committee is likely to take a
more conservative approach to insurance than the insurance industry or
individual banks. The compilation and sharing of loss information will
facilitate the task of grasping a more accurate picture of insurance to mit-
igate OpR.
With personal liability of executives being increasingly legislated in the
United Kingdom, the scope of insurance against any operational
problems is likely to increase. 166 This is an even greater reason for insur-
ance to be contemplated for any capital charge.
E. THE EFFECT OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
The consolidation of operations as a result of mergers and acquisitions
may be an occasional happening for most financial institutions, but it has
the potential of great OpR. This becomes evident when the computer
system fails to consolidate at the merger date, as evidenced in the experi-
ence of Mizuho Bank, one of the largest banks in the world in terms of
asset size. The consolidation of Mizuho's retail computer system was not
accomplished by its merger date on April 1, 2002, resulting in large-scale
problems in the computer system. 167
OpR related to mergers and acquisitions are not limited to system
risks, although these are more conspicuous. The policies and processes of
merging institutions need to be consolidated, with the management
agreeing on a viable internal structure. The reporting structure also has to
be clarified so as to avoid any potential conflicts.
David Sherman has drawn up a comprehensive list of some of the OpR
involved in consolidating operations: 168
165. For a list of some of common insurance contracts that cover operational losses see
Id., Annex 4.
166. See discussion infra Part V.F.
167. Direct debits for utilities failed to take place and double debiting was taking place
in some accounts. 2.5 million transactions failed to take place on the first day
alone. Many of the utilities companies are planning to claim damages, which
might cost Mizuho trillions of yen.
168. David A. Sherman, 10 Points to Consider in Reducing Consolidation Risks, RMA
J., Nov. 2001, at 60.
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1. A comprehensive plan covering the entire consolidation pro-
cess should be drawn at the outset (for example, decision on
accounts, training, implementation of new software,
contingencies).
2. "Consistent approval procedures and multiple approvals for
each task improve the planning process"169 (for example, finan-
cial impact, staffing needs, degree of difficulty, risk, internal
control, compatibility with existing programmes, process flows,
contingencies, qualitative and quantitative projections).
3. Clear lines of accountability, an overall manager, and a senior
committee provide an effective control framework.
4. The ability of the management information system to track all
tasks through completion is critical to senior management
oversight.
5. The use of consultant to augment the technical expertise of staff
and to provide third-party validation of the plan adds consider-
able control to risk management programme.
6. A comprehensive reconciliation programme covering all ac-
counts before and after consolidation is one of the most effec-
tive control techniques.
7. Mapping, testing and mock conversions are required for
control.
8. A pre-launch checklist, a detailed timetable, and formal and
frequent communication practices constitute a good control en-
vironment for the actual consolidation weekend.
9. Audit's involvement throughout the planning/implementation
process significantly reduces internal control surprises.
10. A post-consolidation study improves future consolidations.
It is also important that the internal structure be adequately consoli-
dated. One of the major barriers to bank mergers of Japanese banks has
been the lack of consolidation of the personnel system. In some merged
banks, CEOs have been alternatively selected from the merged institu-
tions. 7 0 Bank regulators should closely supervise the consolidation pro-
cess since a merging financial institution itself will generally not have the
experience of the process and problems entailed.
F. SANCTIONS
Sanctions against non-compliance to OpR related regulations are be-
coming increasingly strict. This reflects a general trend of stronger sanc-
tion regimes, greater administrative enforcement, and criminal
sanctions. 171 Increased personal liability is also part of this develop-
169. See id.
170. See Mamiko Yokoi-Arai, Changing the Nature of Financial Regulation: Observa-
tions on the Japanese Approach, 18.1 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. (forthcoming Win-
ter 2003).
171. The UK is continuing this trend with the Company Bill including greater personal
liability. INSTITUTE OF CHARTERED SECRETARIES AND ADMINISTRATORS, RE-
SPONSE TO THE CONSULTATION ON MODERNIZING COMPANY LAW 47(Presented to
Parliament by the Secretary for Trade and Industry, Cm. 5553-I, July 2002).
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ment.172The FSA spells out the enforcement measures in its "Enforce-
ment Manual."' 7 3 Individuals will be personally liable only when he or
she is personally culpable.' 74 If "due and reasonable care was exercised
when assessing information, [and a person] has reached a reasonable con-
clusion and has acted on it"175 that person would not be in breach of the
rules.176
OpR breaches that would invoke personal liability would have to be
outright fraud or market abuse, which could also entail criminal sanc-
tions. However, the FSA is equipped with a variety of enforcement tools
that could have reputational consequences such as public censure, finan-
cial penalties, or withdrawal of approval. 177 More generally, the FSA
would use disciplinary actions against firms and approved persons for ill
managed OpR.178 Disciplinary measures include public statements of
misconduct and public censures, 179 as well as financial penalties.180 When
the FSA considers it inappropriate to take formal disciplinary action, a
private warning can also be made. 18 1 When the fitness and propriety of a
firm or an approved person is under question, the firm's authorization
can be cancelled or withdrawn.' 82 Alternatively, the individual's status
can be withdrawn or that individual can be prohibited from performing
specified regulated activities. 83
The reputational risk of any disciplinary measure can have grave nega-
tive effects on the firm. The threat of enforcement is real since the FSA's
enforcement regime has been extremely proactive.
V. CONCLUSION: THE REGULATORY IMPLICATION
OpR regulation has been a relatively discrete area as explained
above,1 84 but the real monetary losses that stem from OpR and the in-
creasing complexity of financial business have given rise to a fresh impe-
tus to control OpR. It is also an area where regulation is accepted, even
by the ardent free marketers, for the prevention of fraud and money-
laundering.' 8 5 Fraud has been the principal contributor to bank failures in
172. In the UK, acts that hold directors liable for personal civil liability include the
Companies Act 1985, Disability Discrimination Act 1995, Financial Services and
Market Act 2000, Race Relations Act 1976, and Sex Discrimination Act 1975. See
BALDWIN & ANDERSON, supra note 136, Annex 1-3.
173. See, e.g., FIN. SERVS. AUTH., THE ENFORCEMENT MANUAL (Aug. 2000).
174. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., HIGH LEVEL STANDARDS FOR FIRMS AND INDIVIDUALS-IS-
SUES ARISING OUT OF CP35 AND CP26 (Policy Statement, June 2000), at 10, at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/policy/p31.pdf.
175. Id.
176. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., FSA HANDBOOK, APER 3.1.4G(1) (Oct. 2002).
177. FIN. SERVS. AUTH. supra note 173.
178. Id. ch. 12.
179. Id. ch. 13.
180. Id. ch. 14.
181. Id. ch. 15.
182. Id. ch. 16.
183. Id. chs. 8, 9.
184. See supra Part I.
185. Ross CRANSTON, PRINCIPLES OF BANKING LAW 73 (1997).
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the United States. 18 6
The significance of OpR is also reflected in the increased emphasis of
internal controls and systems by regulators. The Federal Reserve System
has changed its focus of supervision on internal systems and controls. 18 7
In addition, the Basel Committee has proposed the inclusion of OpR in
the calculation of capital adequacy. These changes are the result of
greater reliance on information technology, and the awareness of in-
creased OpR due to compromised information security and the threat
posed to business continuity at times of system failure.
The focus on OpR is a necessary step to improve the safety and sound-
ness of the financial system, and although OpR may not often lead to
systemic risk, it is an important part of financial stability and con-
tinuity. 88 It is a crucial part of preventive and prudential regulation of
the financial system.
Financial institutions have been cutting costs of operations mainly
through disposing of excess employees, the greatest fixed cost, and in-
stead relying on computers where possible. This trend may be reversed if
OpR management is strengthened. The management and control of OpR
does, after all, require greater investment in human resources. The re-
newed regulatory regime that is emerging towards OpR is likely to have
some financial impact on financial institutions in terms of not only regula-
tory compliance cost but also of the review of internal structures. On top
of this will be the regulatory changes that will come in effect in a few
years time. The Basel Committee's QIS has already had a great regula-
tory burden on cooperating financial institutions. While the identification
of loss events will be an important step in OpR management, the initial
burden on financial institutions is likely to be considerable.
The main focus of financial institutions in relation to OpR manage-
ment, at least for the larger institutions, is likely to be on compiling quan-
tification methodologies of OpR. This is relevant to the Basel
Committee's effort because it would enable them to use approaches
geared towards the individual institution. However, this focus may not
necessarily be the right way to proceed in the immediate future.
Revision of management involvement and improved internal audit and
controls are the key to a good OpR management framework. These are
main items in all the supervisory manuals, and they reflect the impor-
tance of addressing these issues. Risk culture is also a significant factor
186. FEDERAL RESPOSE TO CRIMINAL MISCONDUCT AND INSIDER ABUSE IN THE NA-
TION'S FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, H.R. REP. No. 98-1137, a 5 (1984) cited in
GEORGE BENSTON ET AL, PERSPECTIVES ON SAFE AND SOUND BANKING: PAST,
PRESENT AND FUTURE 254 (1986).
187. Letter from Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation, Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, to the officer in charge of supervision and appro-
priate supervisory and examination staff at each federal reserve bank and to cer-
tain domestic and foreign banking organizations supervised by the Federal
Reserve,(June 23, 1999) ( SR Letter 99-15).
188. The UK regulators have been focusing on "business continuity." See supra Part
IV.D.
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that needs to be taken into consideration when contemplating the struc-
ture of OpR control. Given the cost factor of good OpR controls. the
inclusion of insurance and outsourcing into the calculation of the capital
charge for OpR would be crucial for the Basel Committee to reach an
agreement on OpR.
A gradual regulatory approach is essential to ensure that financial insti-
tutions do not take a piecemeal approach to the sound practices that are
encouraged. While it is recognized that a prescriptive approach to OpR
would be an appropriate regulatory regime, it would be useful for super-
visors to develop questionnaires that identify the key elements upon
which financial institutions would need to improve.
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ANNEX
SOUND PRACTICES FOR THE MANAGEMENT AND SUPER-
VISION OF OPERATIONAL RISK
DEVELOPING AN APPROPRIATE RISK MANAGEMENT
ENVIRONMENT
PRINCIPLE 1: The board of directors should be aware of the major
aspects of the bank's operational risks as a distinct and controllable risk
category that should be managed, and it should approve and periodically
review the bank's operational risk management framework. The frame-
work should provide a firm-wide definition of operational risk and lay
down the principles of how operational risk is to be identified, assessed,
monitored, and controlled/mitigated.
PRINCIPLE 2: The board of directors should ensure that the bank's
operational risk management framework is subject to effective and com-
prehensive internal audit by operationally independent, appropriately
trained and competent staff. The internal audit function should not be
directly responsible for operational risk management.
PRINCIPLE 3: Senior management should have responsibility for im-
plementing the operational risk management framework approved by the
board of directors. The strategy should be implemented throughout the
whole banking organization, and all levels of staff should understand
their responsibilities with respect to operational risk management. Senior
management should also have responsibility for developing policies,
processes and procedures for managing operational risk in all of the
bank's products, activities, processes and systems.
RISK MANAGEMENT: IDENTIFICATION, MEASUREMENT,
MONITORING, AND CONTROL
PRINCIPLE 4: Banks should identify and assess the operational risk
inherent in all material products, activities, processes and systems. Banks
should also ensure that before new products, activities, processes and sys-
tems are introduced or undertaken the operational risk inherent in them
is subject to adequate assessment procedures.
PRINCIPLE 5: Banks should implement a process to regularly monitor
operational risk profiles and material exposure to losses. There should be
regular reporting of pertinent information to senior management and the
board of directors that supports the proactive management of operational
risk.
PRINCIPLE 6: Bank should have policies, processes and procedures to
control or mitigate operational risks. Banks should assess the feasibility
of alternative risk limitation and control strategies and should adjust their
operational risk profile using appropriate strategies, in light of their over-
all risk appetite and profile.
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PRINCIPLE 7: Banks should have in place contingency and business
continuity plans to ensure their ability to operate as going concerns and
minimize losses in the event of severe business disruption.
ROLE OF SUPERVISORS
PRINCIPLE 8: Banking supervisors should require that all banks, re-
gardless of size, have an effective system in place to identify, assess, moni-
tor and control or mitigate operational risks as part of an overall
approach to risk management.
PRINCIPLE 9: Supervisors should conduct, directly or indirectly, regu-
lar independent evaluation of a bank's policies, procedures and practices
related to operational risks. Supervisors should ensure that there are ap-
propriate reporting mechanisms in place which allow them to remain ap-
prised of developments at banks.
ROLE OF DISCLOSURE
PRINCIPLE 10: Banks should make sufficient public disclosure to al-
low market participants to assess their approach to operational risk
management.
Comparative Analysis

